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UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: 






The purpose of project is to examine two alternatives among the numerous 
recommendations to improve United Nations Peacekeeping. The first calls for improved 
centralization of United Nations Peacekeeping. The second calls for unification of 
Peacekeeping operations through joint efforts (political, economical, cultural, religious, 
military, etc.) at the regional level in order to include the parties involved in the conflict 
and their neighboring states in Africa, America, Asia and Europe. The goal of this project 
is to identify and understand the debate about the changing role of the United Nations 
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United Nations (UN) peacekeeping (PK) mediates peace negotiations, facilitates 
recovering constructive relationships between parties to a conflict and supports 
reintegration of society. It is an important instrument of the world community for 
maintaining international peace and security. As stated in the UN Charter’s Preamble 
(1948): “We the peoples of the United Nations are determined to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war” and “… to combine our efforts to accomplish these 
aims.” 
The size, cost, and scope of UNPK activities have changed dramatically since the 
1940s. There has been a surge of conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Between 1989 
and 2002 (14 year-period) 39 PK operations (PKOs) were deployed (UN current and 
completed peacekeeping operations) while only 15 were deployed before 1989 (40 year-
period). A rough comparison of the total number of operations and the total number of 
world armed conflicts (minor, intermediate, and wars) over the periods 1948-1988 and 





Table 1. Total number of Peacekeeping Operations and the total number of world 
conflicts (After: The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the World 
Bank) 
 
Expenditures for PKOs also have increased dramatically as depicted in Figure 1. 
UN costs for just one mission (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia (North Atlantic 
Treaty - NATO and other organizations expenditures not included) were estimated to be 
Periods\Regions AFRICA AMERICA ASIA EUROPE MIDDLE EAST TOTAL
Total Conflicts 1946-2001 168 63 174 47 83 535
Wars (included) 44 17 58 12 30 161
Conflicts 1946-1988 87 44 110 16 66 323
Average conflicts per year 2.02 1.02 2.56 0.37 1.53 7.51
Conflicts 1989-2001 81 19 64 31 17 212
Average conflicts per year 6.23 1.46 4.92 2.38 1.31 16.31
Total UN Peacekeeping Operations 1946-2001 19 8 7 10 9 53
Peacekeeping Operations 1946-1988 2 1 3 1 8 15
Average Peacekeeping Operations per year 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.20 0.37
Peacekeeping Operations 1989-2001 17 7 4 9 1 38
Average Peacekeeping Operations per year 1.31 0.54 0.31 0.69 0.08 2.92
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$4.6 billion (UN, Department of Peacekeeping Operations). Moreover, many operations 
have become multidimensional to include PK, peace enforcement (PE), support of 
elections, and humanitarian aid. The type of conflict also has changed - intra-state 





































































Figure 1. Peacekeeping Expenditures: 1947-2001 (After: Renner) 
 
Critics have charged that the UNPK, especially since the end of the Cold War, has 
not been successful. Some focus on its internal operations, specifically its inefficiency 
and lack of strategy and accountability (The Challenges Project, 2002, p. 143). Others 
criticize its failure to respond in a timely manner to major crises, such as its failure to 
deal with the horrible genocides in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia (Report on Wilton Park 
Conference 700). Still others find its results and outcomes to be less than effective, such 
as the UN efforts in Bosnia (Americans & the World). 
There are many recommended changes in UN PKOs to correct these deficiencies 
(e.g., 57 recommendations of The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations - The Brahimi report). This report will focus on one of them - how UNPK 
should be designed. Two options are considered: the centralization of UNPK 
management and alternatively, the decentralization of UNPK through delegation of 
authority and the empowerment of regional bodies. 
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Centralization has its advantages. It offers a unity of purpose and tighter 
coordination among the various organizations that participate in peace operations - non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), UN organizations, national governments and their 
organizations, as well as businesses. It encourages agreement among all the players on 
common goals and a conflict prevention strategy. It promises tighter controls over 
activities, a division of labor, greater economies of scale, and better utilization of 
resources. 
Decentralizing PKOs at the regional level, on the other hand, also has its 
advantages. Regional security systems have the opportunity to take into account each 
region’s unique features and requirements. PK in Africa, for example, is different from 
PK in Asia. Specialized knowledge and expertise also could be developed to fit each 
region’s circumstances. Without long distances to travel, and fewer players to participate 
in the decision making process, regional systems also could respond more quickly before 
crises escalate. In addition, local mediators, more aware of local customs and issues, are 
likely to be more acceptable to combatants. 
Which option - centralization or regionalization - provides the greatest advantages 
and the least disadvantages for peacekeeping in the future? This is the central question 
this project addresses. Chapter II examines the centralized PK system. Chapter III 
outlines what a regional system would entail. Ultimately, the report concludes that there 
are some issues and decisions that are best centralized while others are better 
decentralized at the regional level. Moreover, there is a need for combining UNPK and 
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II. CENTRALIZED PEACEKEEPING SYSTEM 
 
A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
SYSTEM 
 
1. Peacekeeping Definition 
The UN initiated PK as a technique for maintaining international peace and 
security in 1948.1 It is the major international organization whose purpose is to uphold 
world peace and security. According to UN standard definition PK is: “a United Nations 
presence in the field (normally involving military and civilian personnel), with the 
consent of the conflicting parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of 
arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces, etc.) 
and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) or to ensure the safe delivery 
of humanitarian relief.” (UN General Guidelines for Peace-keeping Operations - 
GGFPKO, 1995, p. 5) It means the UN’s presence as a third party in the field should 
mediate (World Bank Institute and Interworks, 1999, Chapter 4.6) peace negotiations, 
facilitate recovering constructive relationships between parties of a conflict, support 
reintegration of society and bring it to a self-sustaining status. 
Military observer missions and PK forces (PKF)2 represent the “traditional” PK. 
Examples of PK activities are monitoring of cease-fires and compliance with agreements, 
investigation of violations, demilitarization, demobilization and disarmament, preventive 
deployment and early warning to the UN Security Council (SC). 
 
                                                          
1 United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 
[http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/untso/background.html]. April 2003. 
On 29 May 1948, the Security Council, in resolution 50 (1948), called for a cessation of hostilities in Palestine and 
decided that the truce should be supervised by the UN Mediator, with the assistance of a group of military observers. 
The first group of military observers, which has become known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 
(UNTSO), arrived in the region in June 1948. 
2 GGFPKO, 1995, p. 9, 
Military observer missions are composed of unarmed officers and range in strength from a few observers to 
several hundred. Peace-keeping forces are composed primarily of armed military units; their strength has ranged from 
about a thousand to tens of thousands of troops. Some examples include UN operations in Cyprus, the Golan Heights 
and Kashmir. 
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2. The Place and the Role of United Nations Peacekeeping 
The Brahimi report sets the PK within main UN Peace Operations’ (POs) 
elements along with Conflict prevention, Peacemaking and Peace-building. In a couple of 
cases, the UN has implemented PE because of a lack of local authority or its malfunction, 
possession of heavy armaments by opposing parties and extremely dangerous situations 






Figure 2. Peace Operations and Peace Enforcement (After: The Report of the 
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 2000, pp. 2-5) 
 
Conflict prevention and Peacemaking employ diplomatic ways to avoid 
confrontations. Conflict prevention touches the bottom-line of PO because it creates the 
base of peace in the long run through restructuring sources of potential conflicts before 
their eruption. Peacemaking mediates negotiations between parties to the dispute. Peace-
building opens the reconstruction of peace foundations shortly before the conflict ends. 
Some authors use a term “peaceshaping” referring to the combination of all the 
aforementioned activities.3 In practice, peaceshaping is a complex dynamic process and 
                                                          
3 Bideke. Maria. “The Future for UN Peacekeeping.” 
[http://www.justint.org/the%20future%20for%20un%20peacekeeping.htm]. April 2003. 
The term ”peace shaping” is a new way of defining a UN peace strategy, and the Nordic countries first launched 
this expression in a document in 1991. This document is often called ”the Skagen Document” after the town where it 
was negotiated, and it sets up twelve points of how to shape the UN peace operations to be more efficient. Peace 
shaping is really a combination of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace building, and the aim is to create an extensive 
strategy for peace. 





War for Peace 
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all components are interrelated and interdependent. The Brahimi report recognizes the 
advantage and importance of long-term Conflict prevention as a better and cheaper 
alternative to violent conflicts and PKOs. 
Bideke points out the recent tendency of mixed PK actions - PE under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter and Traditional PK under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. She 
describes the most common view of PKO as Traditional PK with an extension through 
PE or “more forceful actions”. PK is the last diplomatic tool different from war. Between 
the two poles there are many possible combinations of approaches and problems before 
such PKOs. So, they are still in a “growing gray zone”. PE is designed to fight any threats 
to the peace, violations of the peace, or acts of aggression. 
There are other ways (networking) of dealing with the PK such as: COW4 (e.g., 
NATO operations in the Balkans) and hiring private troops of mercenaries.5 However, the 
UN does not provide funds to them. A new doctrine of mixed PE and PKOs has been 
developed in NATO and the United Kingdom and it is called Peace Support Operations 
(PSO). (German Institute for International and Security Affairs - GIISA, 2001, p. 27). 
The goal of the Doctrine is to “win the peace, not to win the war” through complex 
multifunctional operations. 
Urquhart has described three historical phases of mankind’s efforts toward 
international peace and security after World War II in his article The United Nations' 
Capacity for Peace Enforcement. He makes a good point on the major drawback of the 
SC in PKOs – a failure to enforce its own decisions, and gives Bosnia as an example. 
Akashi distinguishes four generations of PKOs. He considers the first-generation 
of PKOs as a classical type of PKOs. Its purpose is to end conflicts through disengaging 
                                                          
4 Robert. Grant. “Coalitions of the willing: NATO and Post-cold war, Military intervention.” 1999. p. 3. 
[http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/grant.pdf]. April 2003. 
Non-Article V Western military interventions, based on coalitions of the willing regardless of whether NATO is 
institutionally involved or not, have in reality become the Alliance's core military mission. 
5 Bandow. Doug. “The End of U.N. Peacekeeping.” 2000. [http://www.cato.org/dailys/06-12-00.html]. April 
2003. 
The only strategy that has worked is military force. In 1995, Sierra Leone's government was tottering before an 
offensive of the Revolutionary United Front. The regime hired the firm Executive Outcomes, made up of South African 
mercenaries, which routed the RUF. 
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parties and stopping their fight (securing a safe distance between opposing groups, 
monitoring cease-fires, maintaining a peaceful time for negotiations and resolution of 
disputes). They have impartial and symbolic nature and rely on the consensus of parties 
to the conflicts. Thus, UN forces are not required to fight, carry heavy equipment and 
pass through long expensive combat training. 
New challenges to PK after the end of the Cold War forced the UN to undertake 
multidimensional PKOs (multi-faceted operations with complex functions including 
strengthening a local administration or its temporal replacement, human rights protection, 
refugee issues, facilitating elections, development, etc.). Such operations call for division 
of labor and diversity of experts: military officers, police officers and civilian experts. 
PKOs were transformed and have grown to second-generation. Both, the first and second 
generations, employed the same PK principles and according to Akashi were relatively 
successful. 
He outlines third-generation PKOs as PE (based on the concept of coercive peace, 
or "peace enforcement") and gives the example of PKO in Somalia, which ended in 
tragedy. The operations are aimed at fighting a hostile environment and tremendous 
human rights violations. Akashi emphasizes a need for UNPK enterprise to work in the 
field with multinational forces and strategic allies – regional organizations (ROs) and 
especially NATO. 
Recently the UN Secretary general (SG) stated new directions for UNPK by 
reconsidering its conventional principles and transition to fourth-generation PKOs 
(Akashi, 2000). They will not be PE, but troops should be equipped with powerful 
weapon systems and pass enhanced training. It is necessary in order to deter the great 
number fighting parties of civil wars that do not want to negotiate in any circumstances. 
Forces should have the capacity for self-defense. Significant progress has been made. 
(UN, Report of the SG). 
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3. Principles of United Nations Peacekeeping 
UNPK is governed by few principles. Dag Hammarskjöld6 (the Second UN 
Secretary-General and one of the fathers of UNPK along with Pearson7 and Urquhart8) 
created the following Principles of the Traditional UNPK (United Nations Association, 
United Kingdom, UNA-UK, United Nations Peacekeeping): 
Legitimacy 
A mission must have the authorization of the SC. 
Consent and Cooperation 
UN involvement in a conflict requires the consent of the parties to that conflict. 
Impartiality and Objectivity 
A mission must maintain operational neutrality and so must not influence the 
political balance of power between warring parties. 
Non-use of Force 
PK should not use coercive force, except in self-defense. 
Personnel for an Operation Must be Recruited Voluntary from UN Member 
States 
The five permanent (P5) members of the SC and states with interests in a conflict 
are excluded from the troop-contributing countries (TCC). Later the principle was 
developed to achieve a Sustained commitment of troop-contributing countries that calls 
for complete and active participation of all national units in the mission. 
There are three more principles (GGFPKO, pp. 13-24): 
                                                          
6 Nobel e-museum. “Lester Bowles Pearson – Biography.” 
[http://www.nobel.se/peace/laureates/1957/pearson-bio.html]. April 2003. 
7 United Nations. [http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/dag/bio.htm]. April 2003 
Dag Hjalmar Agne Carl Hammarskjöld was Secretary-General of the United Nations from 10 April 1953 until 18 
September 1961 when he met his death in a plane accident while on a peace mission in the Congo. 
8 University of California. Berkeley. “Sir Brian Urquhart.” 
[http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/UN/Urquhart/urquhart.html]. April 2003 
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Continuous and Active Support of the SC 
Refers to the complexity of a PO, whose component is PK, and the need for 
consequential political and diplomatic actions from all UN Member States (MS) 
in support of SC and SG. 
Clear and Achievable Mandate 
Sets predetermined and realistic objectives that should reflect agreements for 
political and material support and optimize the goals to achieve. 
Unity 
The international community should maintain integrity as a whole and that of the 
units in the field. 
PE does not obey some of Traditional PK principles such as: Consent and 
cooperation, Impartiality and Non-use of force. UNPK principles are based on the 
international principles of state political independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity (UN General Assembly Resolution – GAR 2625 (XXV). 
On the other hand, Akashi describes PKO as activities designed “to temporarily 
freeze a conflict situation, rather than establish lasting peace”. They should be replaced 
and followed by consistent peacemaking. PKOs have psychological and moral meanings 
and represent the international community's will for peace. Akashi outlines only the three 
most important PKO principles: consent and cooperation (the agreement between parties 
involved in a conflict to accept the deployment of PKF), impartiality and objectivity, and 
the limited use of weapons by PK troops, only to their self-defense. 
The principles impose specific demands on the UNPK System (UNPKS) such as: 
a central authorization body – SC9, UN direction, volunteering with certain limitations, 
co-operation of parties, political and military neutrality, and predetermined mandate of 
                                                          
9 United Nations. “Security Council.” [http://www.un.org/Overview/Organs/sc.html]. April 2003 
The Security Council has primary responsibility, under the Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. It is so organized as to be able to function continuously, and a representative of each of its members must be 
present at all times at United Nations Headquarters. 
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force level. Hence, the UNPK should maintain a centralized system with an appropriate 
hierarchy, links between its structural elements, forces with high readiness, logistics, 
flexible funding, etc. 
 
4. United Nations Peacekeeping System 
United Nations Peacekeeping System Hierarchy 






Figure 3. Hierarchy of United Nations Peacekeeping System (After: United 
Nations, The United Nations System) 
 
The General Assembly (GA) is the main governmental organ of the UN. Each MS 
is represented and has one vote. The GA makes decisions on the most important 
questions regarding peace and security, admission of new MS, budgets, etc. However, the 
GA’s decisions do not have legal binding force for individual governments. The GA 























of missions as well as all financial issues of the UNPKOs and allocates them to its Fifth 
Committee (Administrative and Budgetary). 
For a better understanding of GA functions it is necessary to include the 
committees established for different purposes and considering PK issues such as: the 
Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization), Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations, the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) and The 
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). The 
committees facilitate the GA activity in specific spheres. 
Fifteen countries are represented in the SC. There are five permanent MS (P5): 
China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, United States of America; and 10 countries with two-year membership terms 
from each of the world's regions such as: Africa and Asia (5), Latin America (2), Eastern 
Europe (1), Western Europe and other states (2). Thus, all regions are represented. On the 
other hand, each SC member has one vote and each state of the P5 has a right of veto. If 
the P5 lack unanimity, the situation can be overcome through the UN Uniting for Peace 
Resolution, empowering the GA for decision-making only in such occasions. Article 39 
of the UN Charter gives the SC power to conduct PK and deploy missions as a principal 
organ: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide 
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.” The SC acts on behalf of all MS. According to 
the UN Charter, MS should accept and implement the SC’s decisions. Nine SC members 
must vote affirmatively in order for decisions to be made. Thus, the central organ of 
UNPK hierarchy bears a potential for extended discussions and consultations, a high 
level of output uncertainty, compromises and delays (Malone, 1998). There is a constant 
pressure for improvement of the SC composition, legitimacy and effectiveness (Limbert 
and Ramsbotham, 2000). 
The SG is the Chief Administrative Officer of the UN (Article 97 of the UN 
Charter). The SG and the UN Secretariat staff have to act only under instructions and 
authority of the Organization (Chapter XV of the UN Charter). They are international 
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officials and employees responsible only to the UN. The SG appoints the staff according 
to the regulations of the GA. The staff is assigned permanently to UN organs and is a part 
of the Secretariat. Staff policy is to maintain the highest competence, efficiency and 
integrity. An important factor is utilizing a geographical approach to the staff recruitment. 
The Secretariat includes the SG and the staff employed for UN Headquarters and 
fieldwork. The SG runs PKOs and informs the SC on the progress of missions. 
The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) provides means for the 
SG to carry out the decisions of the SC. Its functions include: formulating political and 
executive direction to field operations and procedures, generating recommendations for 
new PK missions, their planning and logistics support (GGFPKO, pp.38-39). It is a 
mediator between the SC, the troops, the parties involved in the conflict and financial 
sponsors. The head of DPKO is the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 






Figure 4. Department of Peacekeeping Operations Organizational Chart (From: 
United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Organizational Chart) 
 14
 
It becomes obvious from the figure that the DPKO, especially its Office of 
Operations, has a regional specialization. 
The SG appoints a Special Representative\Chief of Mission (SRSG) responsible 
for UN PKOs in specific regions with the approval of the SC. GGFPKO defines terms 
such as “head of a peacekeeping operation” and “chief of mission” applied to SRSG. He 
maintains an operational control over a mission on behalf of the SG and delegates 
authority to subordinates after consultations with UN Headquarters. SC resolutions and 
the letters of appointment give SRGSs specific mandates. Generally, the SRSG is 
internationally recognized and an individual the SG knows. For instance, Behrooz Sadry, 
a Deputy Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, joined the 
UN in 1957. He has had a distinguished career and a long experience in UNPK – Sierra 
Leone, Angola, DPKO, former Yugoslavia, Mozambique, etc. Another example is 
Legwaila Joseph Legwaila of Botswana - a SRSG and a Head of UN Mission in Ethiopia 
and Eritrea. A SRSG’s role is to be an ambassador of the UN to the parties of a conflict. 
Their contributions should facilitate crisis solution in the region. 
The chief of the military element of a PKO is either a Force Commander (FC) or a 
Chief Military Observer (CMO). A FC discharges operational authority over all of the 
mission’s military units and their personnel. The recent multi-dimensional PKOs call for 
carrying out humanitarian relief, development, and other PK related tasks simultaneously. 
The features of PKOs impose a centralized authority of a FC over all active elements of 
the UN for enhanced coordination. The FCs are distinguished military officers of MS. 
The SRSGs provide political directions to FCs, mediate the reporting of FCs to and the 
approval of crucial operations by Headquarters in New York (Anyidoho, 2000). 
Obviously, the SC maintains political control and leadership over PKOs through the SG, 
SRSGs and FCs. 
The predominant part of the UNPKS is multinational and bound only by a moral 
duty to uphold peace and security in other regions. There are two major players - MS and 
their alliances, on one side, and the executive organs of the UN Secretariat, SRSGs and 
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DPKO, on the other side. The last is the heart of the system. On the other hand, MS 
should provide political will, cooperation and resources. 
United Nations Peacekeeping System Resources 
The UN does not have an army. MS provide military and police personnel to the 
UN on an ad hoc basis but they remain under respective MS’s overall authority. For 
example, UN troops wear distinct national uniforms and only blue helmets are common. 
National laws and regulations of MS continue to govern their military and civilian police 
personnel. They must obey the laws and regulations of host nations as well. The UN 
exercises only operational authority limited to a specific mandate, a mission area and an 
agreed time frame. MS can withdraw their forces when circumstances threaten the lives 
of contingency personnel. By the end of 2000, eight of the ten biggest TCC (UN, 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Peacekeeping from 1991 to 2000) were 
developing countries from Asia: Bangladesh, India, Jordan, Nepal, and Pakistan, and 
from Africa: Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria (in alphabetical order). The participation is 
broader because 123 more states are donors of soldiers, about two-thirds of the UN total 
membership. Of them, Canada is the country with highest number of participations in 
Peacekeeping Missions (PKMs). Military personnel get additional salaries from the UN.10 
We should keep in mind that there are many volunteers who support PKOs in the field for 
free.11 On the other hand, there are past and recent examples of COW and individual 
states, engaged with significant forces in PK, PE and peace deterrence (Korea, Bosnia, 
Kosovo, East Timor, etc.) at different stages of operations. The personnel policy and 
expenditures in such cases is a responsibility of respective states. 
                                                          
10 United Nations. “United Nations Peacekeeping.” [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ques.htm]. April 2003. 
Peacekeeping soldiers are paid by their own Governments according to their own national rank and salary scale. 
Countries volunteering uniformed personnel to peacekeeping operations are reimbursed by the UN at a flat rate of 
about $1,000 per soldier per month. The UN also reimburses countries for equipment. But reimbursements to these 
countries are often deferred because of cash shortages caused by Member States’ failure to pay their dues. 
11 United Nations Volunteers. “UN Volunteers in peace operations.” 
[http://www.unv.org/infobase/facts/fspeace.htm]. April 2003. 
Close to 5,000 United Nations Volunteers recruited and fielded by the UNV program have served in 19 different 
peacekeeping operations since 1992. They take up assignments in over 175 professional categories in support of 
activities of the UNDPKO. Some 2,000 UN Volunteers have been assigned to new missions in East Timor, Kosovo, 
Congo, Sierra Leone in the last two years alone. They work in civil administration, electoral affairs, human rights and 
carry out administrative or support roles. 
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The UN depends on MS not only for personnel but also for other resources such 
as: vehicles, aircraft, equipment, medicine, etc. Their governments negotiate agreements 
on terms of their participation in UNPKM. The UN Stand-by Arrangements System 
(UNSAS runs most of the resources of UNPK using its UNSAS Military Handbook. MS 
provide resources (military units, civilian and military personnel, services, equipment, 
etc.), against UN reimbursement (for equipment – fixed rate of depreciation), under 
certain conditions within a specified response time. All their resources are stationed in 
homelands and maintained for their purpose and missions. Personnel training is the 
responsibility of the respective states as well. Generally, the above resources are utilized 
mainly for PKOs. Additionally, the UN has its own logistics system and a permanent 
logistics base (UNLB, Brindisi, Italy) for storing (e.g., “Start Up Kits” for new missions), 
rebuilding and shipping materiel world wide, providing satellite telecommunications 
between PKMs, UN agencies and headquarters, and personnel training as well. 
United Nations Peacekeeping Funding 
The assessed contributions are the primary resource of PKOs, even though there 
are voluntary donations. Assessment of contributions from MS to the PKOs budget is 
based on their financial and economic power. The main parameters are average and 
individual Per Capita Gross National Product of MS and group discounts. The countries 
are divided into groups from A to J level. Group A members (P5) pay a premium to offset 
discounts given to those in groups C to J who benefit from a discount of 7.5-90% (UN, 
GAR A/55/712, 2001, pp. 3-4). The five biggest contributors (excluding personnel) had, 
at one point, paid over 75% of PK expenses. That was one of the reasons for a scale 
changing in 2001 (US Department of State, Fact Sheet: The UN’s Ad Hoc PK Scale). 
Only three of them are P5 members - Britain, France and the US. Apportionment of PK 
costs is based on an ad hoc system. Money from the MS goes into the UN Support 
Account for PKOs, DPKO and the Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy. In 1992, a 
Peacekeeping Reserve Fund was established to provide money for the start-up phase of 
PKOs. The fund contributes to UN rapid response policy. It gets money from active 
missions budgets. The PK centralized system is not aligned with the economic power of 
MS because the UN is a non-profit organization. Hence, dues to the PK budget appear as 
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a double edge sword because the contributions have a significant impact on the PK 
direction, scope, resources and efforts. 
A rough comparison between PK total arrears and total expenditures is useful in 
order to get an idea of how PK has been funded. It is necessary to know that overdues 
were accumulated over the years from all completed and current PKOs and can exceed 





Figure 5. Arrears/Expenditures Ratio in Percent (After: Renner) 
 
From the graph is obvious that overdues have a trend of exceeding expenditures 
(over 100%). In other words, UNPK enterprise has been systematically underfunded and 
that obstacle has limited its capacity to undertake new missions. MS donors have had to 
wait to be reimbursed by the UN for their PK services. That has influenced UN reliability 
and the willingness of MS to continue their contributions. That, in turn, undermined the 
UNPK activity, which caused it to fluctuate. In October 1995, SG Boutros-Ghali 
commented on the UN role and the intent of MS to rely on an underfunded organization. 
He described the situation as “responsibility without resources” (UNA-UK, The Financial 
Costs of Peacekeeping). However, it is clear that MS improved their payment discipline 
in the hard time periods of 1991-1992 (e.g., missions in Cambodia, Somalia, etc.) and 
1994-1997 (e.g., missions in Rwanda, Balkans, etc.). 
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On the other hand, according to the Stockholm International and Peace Research 
Institute all sub-regional totals of military expenditures are greater than the entire UNPK 
budget for 1998 (about $908 billion). Hence, regional and sub-regional organizations 
could raise much more resources for PK than the UN. Moreover, it is helpful to know that 
the PE is much more expensive than the traditional PKO. It requires a standby, heavily 
equipped military force from one or more states (e.g., COW).12 
 
5. Basic United Nations Peacekeeping Procedures (UN, Special Topics: 
Peacekeeping) 
General Peacekeeping Issues 
The SC issues resolutions to the SG, which require reports on PK issues. The 
reports provide the SC with information on a mission’s activities within a specific 
timeframe, as well as the SG’s implications and recommendations underlying the SC 
decisions. It sends an annual report to the GA on its entire activity related to UNPK. The 
President of the SC and SG exchange letters on such issues as: appointments of SRSGs, 
FCs, CMOs and compositions of PKMs.  
The GA approves annual budgets for PK. The Fourth Committee of the GA 
completely reviews the PKOs in all their aspects on the basis of the SC PKO report. 
Individual Operations 
The procedure for establishing an operation and its financing, planning and 
preparation is described in GGFPKO (1995, pp. 37-39). The SG sends a report for 
individual missions with information about: the political mandate, the operational plan, 
the staff and its composition, cost estimates for a given time period, and 
recommendations for actions to be taken by the GA. The ACABQ reviews all reports of 
                                                          
12 United Nations Association of the United States of America. “Reimbursement for U.S. Participation in U.N. 
Peace Operations.” [http://www.unausa.org/publications/reimburs.asp]. April 2003. 
Many peace enforcement actions and/or humanitarian interventions undertaken in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and 
Bosnia fall under this category (as does the recent Italian-led, U.N.-authorized mission to Albania). The U.N. may 
endorse or authorize actions by member states in these circumstances, but, because these missions are not U.N.-
administered, there is an understanding that those member states, which choose to participate, will pay their own way. 
Such operations, usually involving a degree of peace enforcement, have thus been carried out by several interested 
member states or coalitions rather than by U.N. forces taking direction from the U.N. Security Council. 
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the SG on financial questions related to the PK and submits its conclusions to the GA and 
the Fifth Committee where they are considered. 
The Fifth Committee examines issues and submits a report to the GA with its 
consideration on those issues. It does the same with the final version of draft 
resolutions/decisions and provides a recommendation for adoption. 
The decision for sending a UNPKM is made by the SC through resolutions when 
an invitation is received from the countries (parties) affected by a conflict. The SC is 
responsible of determining the mission’s mandate and its force level. Then the Fifth 
Committee allocates the mission budget. The DPKO develops and implements a 
deployment plan. (For more information see UN Special Topics: Peacekeeping.) 
PKOs are the main means by which the UN presents to the world its ability to 
maintain global security. MS are “shareholders” of UNPK and they execute its policy by 
providing political support and resources: personnel, equipment, money, etc. for PKOs. 
The UN is a non-profit public organization that acquires assets to perform activities that 
are dependent on the amount and timing of MS payments. Less cash means less 
capability for UNPK. In a situation of under-funding, the expected results are outputs that 
do not match with standards and the defined mission. 
 





The UN has a parliamentary structure and represents most of the states and main 
economic, ethnic and religious groups in the world. The organization protects 
fundamental human rights, the rights of individual and national self-determination, and 
promotes principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence 
(Chapter I of the UN Charter). Its values focus on the beliefs and will of humanity 
(Preamble and Chapter I of the UN Charter). The UN is seen as an unbiased arbiter of 
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conflicts and a reliable partner toward peace recovery and development. The UN is 
congruent with most of the cultures and religions over the world. 
The GA is a ready for use open forum of international cooperation and dialogue 
and a political center with clear rules (see articles 34 and 35 of the UN Charter). The SC 
makes decisions in a highly centralized fashion and the GA exercises an enhanced control 
on overall PK activity under common standards. 
UNPK is based on international law and is a part of a consistent peaceshaping 
process supported by UNMS, NGOs and individuals providing funds and development 
assistance. UNPK can maintain unity of purpose and cohesive efforts, even though, there 
are members unwilling to cooperate for specific operations or when a dominating 
regional power is in opposition. 
Military 
The UN provides PKF with broad and sustainable political support, and 
legitimacy to intervene decisively in every corner of the world. The hierarchy of the 
command chain, along with centralization, has a potential for improved performance. 
Information intervention in a conflict is based on international community support and 
plays a critical role in a military resolution of disputes. For example, there are many 
occasions when parties to a dispute prefer UN troops to facilitate their peace efforts 
instead of forces from Regional Organizations and Arrangements (ROA) or Coalitions of 
the Willing (COW). 
The UNPK doctrine is based on an accumulated knowledge of PK and an 
environment of recurring confrontations in different geographical areas (e.g., organs of 
UN DPKO such as the Situation Center and the Best Practices Unit). DPKO provides 
ready for use expertise. 
Common standards of training and rules of engagement (ROE) assure greater 
coordination of units from different countries and effectiveness. 
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Relatively regular external funding and contributions of troops, equipment and 
services, combined with the SAS maintain military capabilities and resources for rapid 
deployment. 
The UNPK information system and technology are more advanced than those of 
countries in many regions of the world. 
Financial 
UNPK has multiple independent sources of funding that are not tied to the 
economic and fiscal cycles of individual states or that of a particular region. MS, NGOs 
and individuals voluntarily bear and share portions of PK expenses. 
The centralized decision-making on typical PK issues avoids duplicated structures 
and promotes economies of scale due to cost decreases for certain types decisions made 
at one point. (Nadler and Tushman, 1988, p. 112) 
The budgets for operations reflect the missions’ objectives, maintain a reasonable 
balance of required resources and facilitate overall efficiency of operations. The 
subsidiaries of the PK enterprise are under common financial regulations, management 
and audit, which lead to increased accountability and transparency. 
Actually, through UNPK the developed countries transfer money to third world 
countries, which are the main contributors of troops. Thus, UNPK gets PK resources at a 




The procedures and composition (GIISA, 2001, p. 93) of the UN and the SC can 
extend the decision-making process beyond the time limits imposed by real needs. 
(GIISA, 2001, pp. 165 and 167) Crucial moments for conflict and even genocide 
prevention might be missed. According to the Brahimi report (p. 1) one of the three key 
conditions for the success of future multi-faceted operations is rapid deployment. 
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Members of the SC define the UN’s PK competence and thus eliminate state 
sovereignty (University of Maryland). Most of the conflicts have been internal or intra-
state. Recent civil wars require political settlements contradicting the principle of state 
sovereignty and the traditional norms of behavior of countries represented in UN. 
The SC does not adequately represent regions with conflicts and that undermines 
the SC’s legitimacy and effectiveness. However, the Brahimi report (p. 1) outlined 
political support as a key condition for the success of future complex operations. It 
recognizes the failure of PK to respond adequately to the challenges. Recent conflicts 
have “cross-border” or “transnational” effects and engage neighboring countries 
(refugees, engagement of regional military forces, trade issues, conflict-supporting 
activities, etc.). 
UNPKF can only carry out PE in narrow boundaries in order to not threaten its 
political unity. The Brahimi report (pp. viii, 4) discusses the hardships experienced by the 
missions deployed at an early stage before the conflict end - parties involved have not 
been convinced to negotiate, possess heavy weapons and do not hesitate to use them. 
Missions under traditional PK cannot fit such situations with highly dangerous 
environments because of the complexity, the lack of capacity and increased costs. Often 
some of the local parties appear to be “spoilers” – they are not willing to achieve constant 
peace. Sometimes, they sign peace accords just to gain time and take temporal 
advantages. The third key condition for the success of future complex operations is a 
peace-building strategy that could overcome such intents. On the other hand, COW is an 
extension beyond the above boundaries. 
The UN utilizes a highly centralized top-down decision-making approach for 
political settlements in a field characterized by vulnerability and diversity of people’s 
attitudes and support. A challenge to this approach is the need for regular flow of 
information and utilization of modern information systems. The lack of the last element 
was one of the findings of the Brahimi report. 
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Military 
The UN Secretariat has to wait for SC authorization. It then raises and deploys 
troops after the beginning of a conflict. UN involvement at a later stage implies greater 
resources for a timely resolution. Moreover, it contradicts UN policy for conflict 
prevention and early engagement and the key conditions for the success of PKO outlined 
by the Brahimi report. Moreover, the report calls for improved mission guidance and 
leadership participation in mission establishment at its very beginning (shaping mission’s 
concept, plans and other documents), and a global logistics support strategy as well. 
The lack of clear mandates (GIISA, 2001, pp. 79 and 83) and chain of command 
between missions and New York Headquarters, and the slow and inadequate decision-
making on PKOs have lowered PKOs effectiveness and created unwillingness in military 
personnel to take orders from UN commanders instead of their own commanders. 
(GIISA, 2001, p. 84) The main points of the Brahimi report are establishing clear, 
credible and achievable mandates by the SC and the problems caused by a lack of a 
comprehensive staffing strategy. 
There is no UNPK standby army. It is almost impossible for PE to be undertaken 
by a UN contingent. UNPK can easily reach limited force levels (ceiling) for troops, 
equipment, funding and other resources. The Brahimi report (p. 15) emphasizes the need 
for well equipped and trained UNPK troops possessing the capability for self-defense. 
For instance, the stockpile of the most important equipment in UNLB, Italy, has been 
depleted by the surge of operations over the 1990’s and current funding cannot replenish 
it soon. 
PKOs are carried out in a decentralized manner because of their nature. An 
occurrence of many conflicts simultaneously would stretch the UNPKS and result in 
decreased effectiveness (e.g. Rwanda and Balkans). With regard to this the Brahimi 
report (pp. 12-13) pointed out the importance of improved information gathering, 
analysis, and strategic planning capacities. There are constraints for the analysis and 
centralized planning of PKOs such as: diversity of military terminology, technology, and 
personnel technical and English language skills.  
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Multinational Forces (MNF) have different approaches to information networks 
and to decision-making for operations taken far from the frontline and reality in the NY 
Headquarters. Sometimes, the UN systems do not fit the specificity of local infrastructure 
and natural conditions. 
The UN information-processing capacity cannot capture the symptoms of 
potential conflicts and information does not reach central organs, which make decisions 
on operations. The UN cannot use intelligence under international agreement and it only 
gathers information. (CPT Huggins) 
Deployment of UN troops is not standardized under specific models. (CPT 
Huggins) Rapid deployment standards are defined by the Brahimi report (2000, 
paragraphs 86-91, pp. 15-16). On the other hand, centralization and the lack of mission 
autonomy often remove achieved temporal advantages and diminish peacekeepers’ 
motivation. 
Financial 
The UNPK Support Account depends on MS assessed contributions and 
collection of arrears. Under Article 19 of the UN Charter, the only available punishment 
for late payments is the state losing the right to vote in the GA. Moreover, funding for 
newly established missions is ad hoc. 
Many MS are reluctant to increasing assessed contributions because of their 
budget constraints. Others argue that additional money for PK means undermining 
development assistance. In other words, there is an internal competition among MS. 
The UNPK budget provides money for the operations of a medium size 
corporation, but its subsidiaries are deployed all over the world. The limited funding is a 
barrier to further UNPKS development and achieving the desired effectiveness. In turn, 
insufficient PKOs effectiveness leads to MS’s disappointment, demands for changing 
scale of assessments and nonpayment of dues. 
Financial control of PK is not exercised by the DPKO and that decreases the 
flexibility of the Command chain. Inadequate feedback between UNPK field units and 
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the New York Headquarters increases PK expenditures because of missing the right 
momentum for intervention at an earlier phase before conflict eruption. 
The lack of money available for UNPK on several continents is an obstacle to 
initiation new missions by UN. 
The irregular payments of dues to the UN Support Account and the respective 
reimbursements of contributing nations undermine the credibility of the UN. 
 
C. GREATER MOVEMENT TOWARD CENTRALIZATION OF UNITED 
NATIONS PEACEKEEPING SYSTEM 
 
The Brahimi Report (UN. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations. 2000), in response to UN critics, includes 57 recommendations for change 
and transformation of UN peace operations and activities. Some focus on direction 
setting and others concentrate on developing capacity and achieving outputs and 
outcomes. In brief, the basic recommendations that support centralization are as follows: 
- Clear, Credible and Achievable Mandates - the SC should reconcile 
ceasefire and peace agreements with “threshold conditions” (international 
human rights standards, practicability, timelines) and create clear chain of 
command and unity of effort 
- Establishing Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat under 
Executive Committee on Peace and Security through consolidation of the 
existing departmental units dealing with policy and information analysis 
related to peace and security 
- Establishing Integrated Mission Task Forces within UN Headquarters 
for supporting each PKM from its Inception very Beginning (responsible 
for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral 
assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees 
and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and personnel 
recruitment) 
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- Formation of Joint Trained Multinational Brigades for deployment 
within 30 days in cases of traditional PK and within 90 days in cases of 
PKO with great complexity (intra-state conflicts) 
- Establishment of a National Pool of Civilian Police Officers by each MS 
as a part of civilian intervention capabilities and readiness for deployment 
of 1000 officers within 30 days (SG Presents Annual Report on Work of 
Organization, at the Fifty-fifth General Assembly, 12 September 2000) 
- Creating "On-call" Lists of Military and Police Officers and Experts 
(both about 100) by the SC for establishing new missions headquarters 
- Preparing a Global Logistics Support Strategy and Mission Start-up Kits 
in Brindisi to facilitate rapid responsiveness 
- Strengthening DPKO by restructuring and stuffing and assigning 
responsibility for PK budgets 
- Systematic utilization of information technology 
All of the above recommendations are directed to improving coordination and 
control over multi-faceted activities, and increasing information flow for better decision-
making (feedback), resource availability and logistics. The Brahimi report also 
emphasizes the need for a new effective system for conflict prevention using political and 
financial support of other UN organs, governments and NGOs. 
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III. REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING 
 
Think Globally, Act Locally 
 
Rene Dubos, Advisor to the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment in 1972 
 
A. DESCRIPTION OF REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING 
 
1. Definition of Regional Peacekeeping 
The international foundations of regional PK and its relationship with the UN are 
formulated in article 52, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter: “Nothing in the present Charter 
precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such 
matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate 
for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are 
consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”. Moreover, the SC has 
an obligation to encourage pacific settlements through regional arrangements or regional 
agencies before the UN. Member states also can refer local disputes to the SC and the SC 
may give recommendations at any stage to the parties of dispute, even take into 
consideration their common decisions. At any time, parties can use the options provided 
by articles 34 and 35 of the UN Charter. Any member of the UN or a non-member may 
bring its case to the SC or General Assembly for consideration. The only preliminary 
condition is an acceptance of pacific settlements under the UN Charter. 
 
2. Types of Regional Organizations 
The type of regional organization (RO) has a great impact on security cooperation 
between members. Toivio (1997) provides a helpful grouping of ROs. They are 
comprised of three broad categories: classical ROs, collective self-defense organizations 
and organizations primarily created for more general purposes. 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organization of 
American States are examples of classical ROs. Main features of this type are: they fall 
under chapter VIII of the UN Charter; they cover a well-defined geographic region and 
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parallel the structures of the UN; and they do not have the power of the SC regarding 
peace and security in their region. 
An example of collective self-defense organizations is NATO. It is designed for 
mutual self-defense and is bound by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty that considers 
an attack against any one of the member states as an attack against all. Activities beyond 
the scope of Article 5 are considered "Non-Article 5 Operations" or other than a 
collective self-defense. In these cases, actions against states or parties that are not pure 
aggression may refer to maintenance of international peace and security by ROs under 
Article 52 of the UN Charter. For example, the North Atlantic Council declared its 
support and resources to regional PK under the authority of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the UN.13 
Examples of general purpose ROs are the European Union (EU), the African 
Union (AU) and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). They primarily 
deal with issues that are more general than security policy problems. Relationships 
among the member states are based on long-term interests such as economic concerns 
and cultural affairs. They serve as a foundation for consistent regional development, 
enhanced security and political coordination among the member states. 
There are many ROs over the world but most of them neither have the security 
functions nor the operational capacity to initiate PKOs. Some regional bodies have 
developed and utilize mechanisms for conflict prevention including a deployment of 
Peacekeeping missions.14. 
                                                          
13 NATO. "Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Oslo, 4 June 1992.” 
[http://www.nato.int/docu/basics.htm]. May 2003. 
The Alliance has the capacity to contribute to effective actions by the CSCE in line with its new and increased 
responsibilities for crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In this regard, we are prepared to 
support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, PK activities under the responsibility of the 
CSCE, including making available Alliance resources and expertise. 
We support the valuable contribution of the United Nations to conflict settlement and PK in the Euro-Atlantic 
region. We reiterate our commitment to strengthening that organization’s ability to carry out its larger endeavors for 
world peace. We welcome the fact that Allies participate in and contribute to United Nations PK and other efforts. 
14 Department of Foreign Affairs. Republic of South Africa. 2001. [http://www.dfa.gov.za/for-
relations/multilateral/ecowas.htm]. April 2003. Continued on the next page. 
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3. Examples of Regional Peacekeeping 
UNPK principles are reflected in the charters of many ROs. Regional 
Organizations and Arrangements from all continents have embedded UNPK principles in 
their guiding documents and have built PK capabilities in identical ways. 
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
The largest regional security organization in the world is the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (formerly CSCE). It has 55 member states (MS) 
from Europe, Central Asia and North America. 
CSCE Peacekeeping will be undertaken with due regard to the 
responsibilities of the United Nations in this field and will at all times be 
carried out in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations. CSCE PK will take place in particular within the 
framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. The 
CSCE, in planning and carrying out PK operations, may draw upon the 
experience and expertise of the United Nations. 
CSCE, Helsinki Document, Article 19. 
Most countries of the Euro-Atlantic region are active members of the OSCE, and 
members of NATO or NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative. OSCE PK deals 
with conflicts between its MS. Its PKOs may employ military and civilian personnel for 
missions such as: cease-fire observation, monitoring troop withdrawals, humanitarian and 
medical assistance, and deployment of forces for large-scale operations. It complies with 
the UN principles of nonuse of coercion, consent and impartiality. Moreover, OSCE 
maintains transparency through informing the UN SC of its PKOs and imposes time 
limits on the activities. One or more of the MS may request OSCE for a PKO. 
A Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) carries out political control and guidance. 
The Council of OSCE is its organ for day-to-day decision-making. Both bodies may 
initiate and deploy PKOs. Their decisions should be taken by consensus and define clear 
and exact mandates. The CSO is distinguished from the SC by its structure and 
procedures. It represents all of its members and does not employ the right of veto. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
The ECOWAS Summit of December 1999 agreed on a protocol for the establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace and Security. The Mechanism includes Council of Elders, as well as a 
Security and Mediation Council. 
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The MS provide personnel upon invitation of the Chairman-in-Office (CIO). The 
Chain of Command is similar to that of UNPK. An ad hoc group assists the CIO and the 
Head of Mission through monitoring of and operational support for the mission. Its 
members are representatives of the MS contributing personnel or providing important 
support. 
For its financial arrangements, the OSCE insists on attaining maximum efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness, clear budgets, predetermined scale of assessments agreed to at the 
beginning of each calendar year, voluntary contributions of and financial accountability 
to the MS. An essential collaboration through resources, experience and expertise could 
be requested from EU, NATO and other international organizations concerned. The Total 
OSCE 2003 Unified Budget is 185.7 Million Euro, including 20.1 Million Euro for 
Missions and Field Operations. (OSCE, The OSCE 2003 Unified Budget by Fund) 
Currently, the OSCE maintains missions, centers, offices and representatives in South-
Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.  
Still on the table are two mutual concurrent ideas - the US has proposed a NATO 
Response Force of 20,000 troops while the EU insists on creation of a EU Rapid Reaction 
Force (EURRF) of 60,000 troops by the end of 2003. Both will impact NATO funding. 
As Wilkinson (2001) points out, “Without the combat power, strategic lift and 
intelligence that only the US can currently offer, neither NATO nor the EURRF is likely 
to deter a hostile and combat capable aggressor, without a very considerable increase in 
European defense spending”  
In March 2003 EU first PKM was established in Skopje, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, where a European Force replaced NATO troops. 
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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Since the middle 1990’s NATO15 has deployed PK troops in the Balkans - 
Implementation Force (IFOR), Stabilization Force (SFOR), Kosovo Force (KFOR) and 
Operation Amber Fox (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). The UN SC gave a 
one-year mandate (December 1995-1996) to the NATO multinational IFOR to secure the 
military aspects of the Dayton Agreement between the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Its 
successor SFOR continues to operate according to a UN mandate for peace enforcement 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Both missions have applied robust rules of 
engagement (ROE) to achieve their objectives and for self-defense. Operation Amber Fox 
was requested by the president of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in order to 
protect international monitoring missions of the EU and the OSCE. The purpose of all 
NATO missions in the Balkans is to support stabilization, build foundations of peace-
building and contribute to the efforts of the UN and other organizations in the field. 
In Kosovo, cooperation between the UN, the EU and NATO was planned from 
the beginning. NATO is responsible for security, the UN runs police and civil services 
(administration, humanitarian assistance, etc.), and the EU is responsible for 
reconstruction of the economy and its further development. The division of labor reflects 
the interests, capabilities and resources of the participating organizations. The strategic 
alliance has a potential to optimize overall efforts and achieve synergy. 
The number of the UN MS contributors to PKOs in the Balkans has increased 
gradually to 37, including countries from NATO, Partnership for Peace initiative, Asia, 
Africa, South America, Australia and New Zealand. The Secretaries General of UN and 
NATO have maintained constructive contacts. Cooperation in PK has led to institutional 
                                                          
15 California National Guard. “NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty.” 
[http://www.calguard.ca.gov/ia/NATO/NATO-treaty.htm]. May 2003. 
The North Atlantic Treaty has continued to guarantee the security of its member countries. Today, following the 
end of the Cold War and of the division of Europe, the Alliance has been restructured to enable it to contribute more 
effectively to the development of cooperative security structures for the whole of Europe. It has also transformed its 
political and military structures in order to adapt them to peacekeeping and crisis management tasks undertaken in 
cooperation with countries, which are not members of the Alliance, and with other international organizations. 
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development of and greater cohesion among the UN, the EU, NATO, the OSCE, and 
organizations and agencies involved in the complex PKOs. They have shared the burden 
of PK and costs over the last decade - billions of US Dollars. For example, NATO 
approved a Y2001 total military budget of 746 Million Euro and seven percent of that 
total was for PSO (NATO handbook). Recently, the EU has initiated deeper engagement 
in European PK and pursues a dominant role. 
The African Union 
The former Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the current African Union 
(AU) is comprised of all 53 nations on the African continent except Morocco. Since the 
middle of the 90’s, African sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS, Republic of South Africa website)16, the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD, Horn of Africa), and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) have played an active role in conflict 
prevention in their sub-regions. 
Regional PK in Africa has long traditions and rich experience. Ameen Jan17 
describes in detail the involvement of African society and ROs in conflict management. 
Fresh examples of regional PKOs are the deployment of international troops to the Ivory 
                                                          
16 The United States Agency for International Development. “West Africa Regional Program.” 
[http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2002/afr/warp/624-007.html]. May 2003. 
Since 1989, violent internal and cross-border conflicts have disrupted economic, social, and political development 
in West Africa with a great cost in human life and property. In the absence of peace and security, development 
programs cannot be sustained. The high costs of peacekeeping missions and rehabilitation activities have caused 
regional leaders to look more closely at strategies of conflict prevention. Thus far, not much progress has been made 
owing to a combination of reasons. First, piecemeal approaches and inadequate institutional frameworks have limited 
preventive activities. Secondly, although civil society organizations represent a potentially powerful force in conflict 
prevention, their efforts remain at the very early stages of development. Thirdly, donor programs have been focused 
largely on mitigation, with few activities in the area of conflict prevention. The result is an environment in which 
potential conflicts are frequently not identified and resolved before they escalate to a level where they extend beyond 
national boundaries. 
17 Jan. Ameen. “OAU/IPA Joint Task Force Report on Peacemaking and PK.” 1998. 
[http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Africa/PublRepoAfriPP98Print.htm]. May 2003. 
The OAU has been preoccupied with the issue of conflict prevention, management and resolution since its 
inception in May 1963. But its ability to act was limited until recently by several factors, including: the OAU Charter 
provision of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states; lack of political will among member states to act; 
perceived fear of competing and sometimes conflicting claims and interests of various actors in a conflict situation; 
absence of a lead country with power and resources to take the initiative and bear the costs attendant with taking action; 
choice of appropriate tools for action; overlapping jurisdiction and competence of other bodies, such as the UN; lack of 
experience or staying power in a peace process until a durable solution is found; and the influence of external powers in 
the furtherance of their own interests in Africa. 
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Coast (five participating nations from the ECOWAS) and the African Mission in Burundi 
(three participating nations from the AU, Agency France-Press). Several developed 
countries provide funding to the ECOWAS’ operation. 
Some of the important PK initiatives were the US-led African Crisis Response 
Initiative (ACRI) and the French Reinforcement of African Peace-Keeping Capacities 
(RECAMP) for the development of African PK capabilities. They have provided many 
African nations with training and equipment for their PK forces. The initiatives are open 
to NGO’s and private organizations. Achievement of self-sustaining capability for 
complex PKO is a joint effort of the developed countries, the UN, the OAU and the sub-
regional organizations in Africa. 
The following ACRI’s principles (US Department of State, Principles of 
Peacekeeping in Africa) are RECAMP’s principles as well and underlay the regional PK: 
Long-term capacity enhancement – self-sustained capacity of a group of 
countries for rapid and effective international PKO; 
Openness – open to all states and international contributors and donors (funding, 
equipment, training, expertise, etc.) unless the UN SC has imposed sanctions on 
them; 
Legitimacy - calls for regular consultations and coordination with the OAU and 
the UN and their close supervision; 
Transparency - full transparency to all stakeholders of the regional PK as a 
prerequisite for increased support from the international community. 
The Organization of American States (OAS) 
The OAS represents 34 MS. Its purposes (Article 2, OAS Charter) are settlement 
of the peace and security, conflict prevention, pacific settlement of disputes and common 
actions in case of aggression on the continent. 
The Association of South-East Asian Nations 
The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has 10 MS. The aim of 
its Bangkok Declaration (Asian Declaration) is: “To promote regional peace and stability 
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through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries 
of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.” 
Initially, Asian countries were firmly opposed to interference in their regional and 
internal affairs. There was a general lack of interest in forming and maintaining regional 
peace associations (McNair, 1998) In addition, some conflicts were too big or explosive 
(e.g. Korea and Taiwan). Thus, the ASEAN members tended to rely on the UN for 
initiating PKO in the region.  
However, the Papua New-Guinea PK mission led by Australia was the first 
regional cooperative PK effort. It launched greater cooperation between neighbor states 
for peaceshaping and building mutual trust through regional PK. 
The Arab League 
The league is comprised by 22 Arab states from Africa and Asia. Most of them 
are members of the AU and/or the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). One of 
its objectives is “maintenance of security and peace according to the principles of both 
the Arab League Pact and the United Nations Charter” (The Arab League, Joint Defense 
And Economic Cooperation Treaty Between The States Of The Arab League).18 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) consists of 12 MS that are 
former Soviet republics: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, and republics from 
Central Asia. One of its goals is peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts among MS 
(Article 2, Charter of CIS). The MS have declared their adherence to the Charter of the 
 
                                                          
18 In 1976 the Arab League decided to put an Arab peacekeeping force in Lebanon. General Aoun. "Prime 
minister General Aoun's weekly address." 1999. [http://www.lebanon-world.org/annashra/english/n136e.html]. May 
2003. 
The experience of Lebanon with the Arab Dissuasion Forces (ADF), the UN Forces, and the Multinational Force 
shows that these forces carried in them the recipe for failure. Some because of their composition, and some because of 
their missions. The ADF was a born failure because of its composition, heavily tilted in its Syrian contingent at a time 
when Syria was the major protagonist in the growing conflict on Lebanese soil. 
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UN, the Helsinki Document and other documents of the OSCE. The CIS intend is 
to play a role of a regional PK organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter 19. 
 
4. Regional Conflicts 
Table 2 depicts a significant increase in the number of conflicts in Africa (on 
average more than six conflicts per year), Asia (fell to about three per year) and Europe 
after the end of the Cold War. A number of civil wars and low level disputes occurred in 
East Europe, Africa, and Central and South-East Asia. They threatened the lives and 
development of millions of people. Genocides occurred in Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia (Stanton, 2002). 
Confronting parties employed political, ethnic, national, religious, racial and clan 
differentiation to kill thousands of their opponents including children and women (e.g., 





Table 2. Total number of deployed PKO and the total number of world conflicts in 
the period 1989-2001 (After: The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and 
the World Bank) 
 
                                                          
19 Security Council. “Resolution on the situation in Georgia, S/RES/1287 (2000).” 
[http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/resolutions/SC00/1287SC00.html]. May 2003. 
Welcoming the important contributions that the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and the 
Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS peacekeeping force) continue to 
make in stabilizing the situation in the zone of conflict, noting that the working relationship between UNOMIG and the 
CIS peacekeeping force has been good at all levels, and stressing the importance of continuing and increasing close 
cooperation and coordination between them in the performance of their respective mandates. 
Periods\Regions AFRICA AMERICA ASIA EUROPE MIDDLE EAST TOTAL
Total Conflicts 1989-2001 81 19 64 31 17 212
Conflicts 1989-1995 42 17 45 25 15 144
Average conflicts per year 6.00 2.43 6.43 3.57 2.14 20.57
Conflicts 1996-2001 39 2 19 6 2 68
Average conflicts per year 6.50 0.33 3.17 1.00 0.33 11.33
Total UN Peacekeeping Operations 1989-2001 17 7 4 9 1 38
Peacekeeping Operations 1989-1995 11 3 3 5 1 23
Average Peacekeeping Operations per year 0.27 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.56
Peacekeeping Operations 1996-2001 6 4 1 4 0 15
Average Peacekeeping Operations per year 0.46 0.31 0.08 0.31 0.00 1.15
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In the period 1996-2001 the average numbers of new conflicts per year erupted in 
all regions, but in Africa (Table 2), the numbers are close to those during the Cold War. 
The PKOs (UNTSO, Palestine, 1948) and the newly established one (UNAMA, 
Afghanistan, 2002) are in regions with the longest conflicts. Recent trends of world 
armed conflicts (Figure 6) show increased conflicts in Africa and Asia, from 61% to 
85%, due to the rise in Africa. Moreover, these regional conflicts represent a new type of 
conflict - intra-state and complex, civil wars with hidden periods and sudden breakouts. 





Figure 6. The shares of conflicts in all regions over the periods: 1946-1988, 1989-
1995 and 1996-2001 (After: The World Bank) 
 
B. UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING 
 
1. Forms of Cooperation Between United Nations and Regional 
Organizations 
The SC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security under Article 24 of the UN Charter. When it comes to enforcement actions 
done by regional arrangements, the SC is the only organ that authorizes and gives them 











monitors their compliance with existing UN guidance. It has a responsibility to assist MS 
and regional associations in developing common PK doctrine and concepts (The 
Challenges Project, 2002, pp. 89-108). 
The information flow to the SC and the monitoring function are guaranteed 
through timely and complete reporting obligations of the ROs and their agencies (Article 
53). Liaison officers and other personnel authorized by the SC communicate with the UN 
and monitor regional activities.  
Although the UN is highly centralized, as indicated in Chapter II, the SC has 
delegated many of its functions to regional bodies (UN, An Agenda for Peace, paragraphs 
64 and 65).20. 
According to the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (paragraph 86) the forms of 
peace support cooperation between the UN and ROs can take the following forms: 
- Consultations (reports, meetings, open or close consultations) 
- Diplomatic support (initiatives of ROs) 
- Operational support (military force, logistic, etc) 
- Co-deployment or agreed upon partnering between missions with distinct 
mandates deployed from the UN and the ROA (ECOWAS - Liberia, CIS-
                                                          
20 64. It is not the purpose of the present report to set forth any formal pattern of relationship between regional 
organizations and the United Nations, or to call for any specific division of labor. What is clear, however, is that 
regional arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be utilized in serving the functions 
covered in this report: preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking and post conflict peace-building. Under the 
Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace 
and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts 
could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and 
democratization in international affairs. 
65. Regional arrangements and agencies have not in recent decades been considered in this light, even when 
originally designed in part for a role in maintaining or restoring peace within their regions of the world. Today a new 
sense exists that they have contributions to make. Consultations between the United Nations and regional arrangements 
or agencies could do much to build international consensus on the nature of a problem and the measures required to 
address it. Regional organizations participating in complementary efforts with the United Nations in joint undertakings 
would encourage States outside the region to act supportively. And should the Security Council choose specifically to 
authorize a regional arrangement or organization to take the lead in addressing a crisis within its region, it could serve 
to lend the weight of the United Nations to the validity of the regional effort. Carried forward in the spirit of the 
Charter, and as envisioned in Chapter VIII, the approach outlined here could strengthen a general sense that 
democratization is being encouraged at all levels in the task of maintaining international peace and security, it being 
essential to continue to recognize that the primary responsibility will continue to reside in the Security Council. 
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Georgia). They can perform similar or interdependent specialized 
functions to resolve complex problems 
- Joint Operations are jointly formed and funded (e.g., UN and OAS in 
Haiti). 
 
2. Principles of Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional 
Organizations 
The Principles for Enhancing Cooperation are the following (An Agenda for 
Peace, paragraph 88): 
- Establishment of mechanisms for consultations (formal and informal); 
- Respect for the primacy of the UN (ROs should not enter into 
arrangements that assume a level of UN support not yet submitted to or 
approved by its MS); 
- Clear preliminary definition and agreement on division of labor in order to 
avoid overlapping and institutional rivalry between the UN and the 
regional bodies when they work jointly with a number of mediators on a 
conflict; 
- Common UN standards to deal with PK when ROs are also MS of the UN. 
 




ROA have certain advantages: interrelated and higher stakes in regional security; 
historical political, ethnic, religious, cultural, and economic relationships; specific levels 
of mutual interdependence; better knowledge of their regions; less expensive resources 
(human, training, equipment, information, etc.); existing channels for early warning 
systems; a potential for rapid and timely response to conflicts in neighbor countries; 
convenient and cheaper rotation of PK contingents and their personnel; common or 
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similar doctrines, terminology and languages; and so on. Such advantages increase 
cohesiveness of regional communities, especially in hard times when the UN cannot 
cover successfully most of the world conflicts itself. 
Political 
The ROs have a parliamentary structure that is likely to represent the states 
involved in or neighbor countries of a conflict. Common interests uphold the 
organizations’ unity of purpose and cohesion. The MS ROs have interrelated and higher 
stakes in regional security and close political, ethnic, religious, cultural, and economic 
relationships. 
ROs are ready to use as open forums for local communities. They are convenient 
tools for permanent cooperation and dialogue, and political centers with predetermined 
rules. The MS make important decisions, especially those for PKOs, by consensus. By 
contrast, decision making within the UN is more labored. Although the SC is comprised 
of only 15 MS, the total number of the UN MS is 191 and any of the permanent members 
of the SC (P5) can preclude decision-making by using the right of veto. 
The UN Charter also recognizes regional security mechanisms as the first line 
barrier against conflict. Their existence increases legitimacy in the eyes of the SC. 
The regional and sub-regional organizations are the middlemen of the UN. Most 
of them are registered under the UN Charter. They are regional players with a lead role in 
particular spheres of PK (political, military, economic, etc.). They have a potential to be 
the most effective mediators because of their knowledge of the region’s political 
environment, culture, economic and other conditions. 
The ROA and the UN share responsibilities on the basis of their comparative 
advantages in order to avoid competition and duplication of structures. Engagement of 
ROA gives opportunities for more flexible decision-making, negotiations and 
compromises, and faster mounting of PKO and achieving the end of the conflict. A 
broader application of UN common doctrine, concepts and standards will promote 
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increasing the level of the GA control over overall PK activity. The UN can drop some of 
its functions and delegate them to ROA. It can focus on the most important indicators of 
crisis. 
Most of the MS of the ROA have direct interests in resolving conflicts as soon as 
possible and they are much more sensitive (existing channels for early warning systems) 
than other states in the world (regional cross border flow of refugees, potential 
immigration, political and economic instability, etc.). 
Dominant regional powers are deeply involved in regional security systems and 
may be able to influence conflicting parties at a higher degree through direct contacts. 
They have much more freedom and can exploit innovative methods to leverage regional 
interdependence. 
The ROA are one more cell in the PK system. They provide an opportunity to 
eliminate the isolation of individual states and organizations, achieve closer cooperation 
and synergy on the basis of comparative advantages, and increase political support and 
direct contributions to PKOs. ROA engagement in regional PK is a necessary step toward 
strengthening the unity of purpose of the entire world community. 
Military 
The ROA with military components, especially those for self-defense (e.g., 
NATO), provide a more suitable political frame for initiating PKOs and sustainable 
support. They have a clearly defined command chain. Long cooperation among MS and 
their military units over years builds knowledge, expertise, mutual reliance and improved 
coordination for rapid response through all military services - air, ground, navy, 
intelligence, etc. 
It is likely that the ROA will have common doctrine, language and procedures and 
be aware of environmental conditions in their geographical areas. They can easily 
establish international schools and courses under common standards of training and ROE. 
Short distances provide an opportunity for joint exercises. 
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The ROA are more flexible than the UN in several important dimensions: 
diversity of resources, deployment of troops, logistics support, and available 
infrastructure close to the frontline. Some ROs may have high tech equipment (e.g., 
NATO). The ROA are near to the field of conflict and can gather and process useful 
information faster. Thus, they can make timely important decisions, and control, 
coordinate and correct their activities in the field. The MS can determine their zones of 
responsibilities and division of labor faster in order to increase overall efficiency. 
The PKOs require frequent rotation of units (every six months) and that gives an 
important advantage to neighbor countries. They can use different armed units according 
to immediate tasks. 
Financial 
The ROA can provide independent sources for funding that will reduce 
uncertainty before particular PKM, especially when a MS does not want to participate. 
Local resources are less expensive than those used by the UN. Expenditures for 
their loading and shipping are many times lower because of short distances and local 
labor rates. In turn, local companies benefit from PK. PK boosts the regional economies. 
Additionally, the developed countries transfer money to the third world countries through 
delegated PK. 
The decentralized decision-making is more focused and employs greater 
expertise. It decreases the costs of PKM. At the regional level it promotes economies of 
scale due to cost decreases at every stage of operations. 
The budgets for operations are related to the ROs long-term goals in their 
respective regions and depend on the level of commitment to regional security. The MS 
can bring additional resources to sustain their involvement and facilitate UNPK. Some 
wealthy countries are committed to providing required resources for their own operations. 
Every state utilizes its existing financial regulations, and its own management and audit 
procedures. This leads to decreased costs for financial control and enhanced 
accountability and transparency. 
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2. Disadvantages 
Regional PK has limitations including: some major regional powers have greater 
power and often a lack of neutrality; low levels of PK capabilities (troops, civilian police, 
headquarters, equipment, etc.); and insufficient training, expertise, management skills, 
and funding. 
Political 
The legitimacy of the international security system still calls for authorization of 
PKOs by the SC and the broad political base provided by the UN. A natural disadvantage 
of ROs is the lack of multinationality, multidimensional response and incompetence in 
some spheres of complex PKOs. 
There is a trend towards increasing reliance on regional and sub-regional 
organizations for conflict resolution. This leads to imbalance and leaving regional bodies 
alone in their efforts. (Speech of the Secretary-General on the future of Peacekeeping 
Operations Georgetown University, February 1999) 
Some ROA do not have specific mechanisms for conflict prevention, management 
and resolution. Sometimes ROs cannot get a consensus, which is an obstacle to initiation 
of PKO in a timely manner. 
Regional powers may dominate institutions in a way that benefits only them.21 
Moreover, MS unintentionally are parties to most of the local conflicts and they 
experience difficulties in maintaining impartiality. Their participation may put at risk 
their own internal stability. 
Many ROA do not have PK capacities and expertise, especially for complex 
PKOs. That requires cooperation between the ROA and the UN under the aforementioned 
principles and mechanisms. 
                                                          
21 Leentjes. Peter. “Do Regional Organizations Have a Future in Peace Operations?” 1999. [http://coe-
dmha.org/Liaison/Vol_1No_3/Feat02.htm]. May 2003. 
Political limitations. Some member states have vested national interests in the country or with the parties to the 
conflict, which undermine the unity of purpose required for cohesive action. Others may be unwilling to support a 
particular operation and divide the alliance. National and party leaders may have personal relationships that 
compromise their impartiality. Some regional bodies are so dominated by one nation that action in the name of the 
regional organization is seen as a cover for the national objectives of the dominating power. 
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Decentralization of PK through ROA increases demand on the UN to improve 
information processing and funding, set adequate goals and standards, monitor ROA’s 
activities and increase its ability to implement corrective actions on time. Diminished 
limitations to low-level decision makers increase the risk of loss of control and worsening 
overall coordination. (Nadler and Tushman, 1988, page 111) 
Military 
A lack of impartiality of the governments could result in different directions and 
goals for their forces, which would decrease the effectiveness of PKM. 
Most of the ROs do not have military forces, resources and experience to carry 
out PKOs (The Brahimi Report, p. 10), so, they need externally provided training, 
equipment and logistical support. There are no regional PK standby armies. 
The ROA have not developed the capabilities to analyze and plan PKOs because 
of constraints such as: diversity of military terminology, technology, technical skills, and 
short and occasional training. Language barriers cause problems in some regions. 
The constant shortage of funding leads to insufficient numbers of joint exercises 
and levels of preparedness for PK contingents, slow deployments, ineffective command 
and control, and poor intelligence and logistics support. Additionally, the number and 
quality of peacekeepers’ equipment do not meet requirements for contemporary PKOs. 
Financial 
Few ROA have money for complex PK, which calls for external funding. PKOs 
are funded ad hoc. Budgets of ROs are substantially below the UNPK budget. 
Organizations and arrangements must count on multiple external sources, which causes 
 great uncertainty. There are controversial views that funding should be provided by 
voluntary trust funds22 or directly by the UNPK budget. 
                                                          
22 FOWLER. ROBERT. R. “Notes for an address by Ambassador Robert R. Fowler, permanent representative of 
Canada to the United Nations.” 1999. [http://www.un.int/canada/html/s-20oct99fowler.htm]. May 2003. Continued on 
the next page. 
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The ROA have sources of funding that are tied with the economic and fiscal 
cycles of individual states or those of a particular region. Very often a conflict can affect 
all countries in the respective region. 
Decentralization of PK brings costs for new local structures and the management 
controlling their activities and duplicated organs as well. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Trust funds established to finance multinational forces, authorized by the Council to replace UN peacekeeping 
missions funded through accepted assessment mechanisms, simply do not work. Most recently, they have not worked 
for ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, nor for INTERFET in East Timor. In Sierra Leone, only $2 million was deposited into 
the Trust Fund, which did not cover even three days of ECOMOG operations. Given this track record, there is no 
reason to expect that trust funds will work in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or anywhere else. 
The reality of the restraints and constraints on government financing in almost every part of the world is such that 




Chapters II and III summarize the advantages and disadvantages of centralizing 
and regionalizing peace operations. From this overview, we find that neither approach is 
satisfactory on its own. Neither one provides the necessary knowledge and resources 
(military, financial, material, information, etc.) to satisfactorily deal with all types of 
conflicts. Thus, this report takes the position that there are aspects of each structural 
feature that need to be incorporated into an overall approach to peace operations. Some 
decisions about PK should be made in a centralized manner, while others should be 
decentralized to the ROAs and the individual states, possibly to NGOs and businesses. 
The following list of measures would enable the UN to take into account the positive 
aspects of both centralization and regionalization and also create a more cohesive and 
integrated peace operation system that would provide overall legitimacy, political will 
and management of the PK enterprise: 
Political 
- The UN SC should retain authorization of PKO, especially PE, and approval of 
achieved accords; 
- Regional bodies, however, should have the right to set up PKOs without SC 
resolutions in order to immediately respond to conflicts and prevent conflicts 
from becoming large-scale crises (Articles 33 and 52 of the UN Charter); 
- While the UN is developing its centralized procedures and organs (e.g. SC, 
Executive Committee on Peace and Security, Integrated Mission Task Forces), the 
ROA should create and apply mechanisms and procedures for conflict prevention 
on the basis of the UN principles and standards that have already been recognized 
(Chapter VIII of the UN Charter). The UN should stimulate and support such 
regional initiatives; 
- The UN should develop a central Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat 
to support ROA and facilitate the responses to complex challenges; 
- ROA and governments also should build early-warning systems and information 
capabilities compatible with UN systems to insure timely and regular information 
flow among all players; 
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- A clear procedure with a mandatory schedule for resolving disputes at every 
consecutive level (parties to the conflict, state, ROA and SC) should be 
established under Articles 33, 34, 3 and, 37 of the UN Charter. Such a procedure 
requires explicit definitions and agreements on the rights and responsibilities of 
states, ROA and the UN; 
- The UN should introduce objective and broadly accepted criteria and measures 
for controlling disputes, especially threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and 
acts of aggression (Chapter VII of the UN Charter). Detailed criteria will speed up 
the decision-making process; 
- A comprehensive incentive scheme for engagement of neighboring and regional 
powerful states in PK should play an important role. An example of incentives 
would be a partial compensation or increased support provided by UN agencies, 
programs and funds. A system of sanctions already exists (economic, arms 
embargoes, travel bans, etc. under Chapter VII of the UN Charter); 
- Regions should introduce specific planning and programming of PK and 
supporting activities that would be compatible with UN PK planning and 
programming. This will give adequate estimates of necessary expenditures and 
help sustain regional PK capabilities. Additionally, it will facilitate integration 
between the UN and regional pools of resources. All participants in PK (at both 
the central and regional levels) will have short and long-term objectives and tasks 
aimed at realizing a common goal. It will remove duplication and promote 
synergy; 
- When a conflict occurs, responses could be assigned to the UN, a ROA or both, or 
to individual governments, NGOs and companies depending on the nature of the 
conflict. Decisions on who participates will be made according the agreements on 
rights and responsibilities of states, ROA and the UN discussed above. 
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Military: 
- Each region should form, equip, and train joint regional military contingents 
(brigades) under UN standards (e.g., SHRIBRIG and Multinational Military 
Peace Force of South-Eastern Europe - MPFSEE); 
- Each region should have clear priorities. A major objective would be to 
participate in regional-mandated operations and/or in UN initiated operations; 
- Since regional PK is not always applicable (many parties of conflicts refuse local 
mediators and negotiations and some regions lack the resources or the will to 
establish and develop PK capacities), the UN should continue to centralize its 
systems for establishing reliable PKO (UNSAS, funding, training and evaluation, 
information gathering, etc.); 
- The UN should integrate available centers, universities, governmental organs, 
etc., dedicated to peace operations in order to standardize PK activities and to 
provide ROA with training in conflict prevention, PK and peace-building; 
- ROA also should accommodate the training and embed UN standards in their 
regulations; 
- ROA, respective governments and the UN should share the costs and resources 
for PK and support forces such as transport and other services provided by 
companies, organizations, and governmental and intergovernmental bodies in the 
region. It should be written in the agreements and secured through consistent 
planning, programming and building PK capacities; 
- The joint training of multinational forces for brigades and regions should become 
standard; 
- Common language for communication and terminology should be mandatory 
among all regions and should be consistent with UN language and concepts. 
Financial: 
- The UN should maintain overall financial management of complex PKO; 
- The UN, in collaboration with ROA, governments and NGOs, should create a 
methodology for gathering information and estimating expenditures for all 
participants in UN-mandated or regionally-mandated operations (PK, PE, PSO, 
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etc.). This would enable all participants to have an accurate set of measures of 
contributions to peace operations and a basis for adequate decisions at the UN and 
regional levels. The Executive Committee on Peace and Security, as a 
coordinating body of the UN components, would then have the opportunity to use 
these measures and information to direct the entire system in the optimal way; 
- ROA should contribute money for local PK and joint training. If a global tax for 
PK is not acceptable, then the UN should promote the idea that part of every state 
or military budget should be redirected for regional PK. The contributions could 
be a certain percentage of the military budgets or specific assessments (e.g., the 
UNPK assessments); 
- The UN should use its central funds to focus on those regions with the greatest 
current needs and meet emerging confrontations; 
- ROA could contribute money for specific activities that reflect their interests or 
are executed by their forces or companies; 
- Different sources of funding (UN, ROA, etc.) should be exploited on the basis of 
temporal borrowing (lending) and repayment (The World Bank could be a 
middleman) or an insurance approach. Diversity of resources (UN, trust funds, 
ROA funds and other) should be used interchangeably to reduce uncertainty of 
funding PKO due to local or UN difficulties. 
In conclusion, this report contends that we need to move beyond the debate on 
whether to centralize or regionalize peace operations. The fundamental solution to global 
security and PK is a combination of UNPK and regional PK incorporating the advantages 
of each into an overall system. The strength of the UN is not in its day-to-day regional 
PK activities but in its potential to focus and optimize global efforts at the desired 
moment and place, to reinforce and build up regional PK capacity, and to maintain peace 
and security in the long run through its network system. 
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